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"CHAOS PREVAILING ON EVERY CONTINENT": TOWARDS
A NEW THEORY OF DECENTRALIZED DECISION-MAKING
IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS*
DAVID G. POST** & DAVID R. JOHNSON***

INTRODUCTION

For the past several years, we have been focusing our attention
on questions about the governance of cyberspace: How should the

rules that apply to conduct on the global digital network be set, and
who should be setting those rules? What polity or polities should we
look to as a source of legitimate and welfare-enhancing rules for

conduct there? Whose law governs the many terms of an Internet
* Presented at the Chicago-Kent College of Law/Cyberspace Law Institute Symposium
on The Internet and Legal Theory, March 13-14, 1998. Thanks to Jeff Williams for his superb
assistance in developing and implementing the complex systems simulations discussed here, to
Joe LaBarge for research assistance, and to Jack Goldsmith, Avery Katz, Dan Klerman, Mark
Lemley, Larry Lessig, Peter Menell, Dawn Nunziato, Steve Salop, Warren Schwartz, David
Skeel, and Peter Swire for their comments on earlier drafts. We have presented versions of this
paper at the Olin Law and Economics Symposium on International Economic Regulation at
Georgetown University Law Center, April 5, 1997, the Aspen Institute's Annual Review:
Internet as Paradigm conference June 19-20, 1997, and the Temple University Law School's
faculty colloquium November 9, 1997, and we thank the many participants who have given us
useful comments on those occasions. We also gratefully acknowledge our obvious debt to the
work of Stuart Kauffman. Comments are welcomed.
Our title is taken from Wislawa Szymborska's poem Psalm, reprinted in POEMS NEW AND
COLLECTED 1957-1997, at 148 (Stanislaw Baraficzak & Clare Cavanagh trans., Harcourt Brace
& Co. 1998).
Oh, the leaky boundaries of man-made states!
How many clouds float past them with impunity;
how much desert sand shifts from one land to another;
how many mountain pebbles tumble onto foreign soil
in provocative hops!
Oh, to register in detail, at a glance, the chaos
prevailing on every continent!
[H]ow can we talk of order overall
when the very placement of the stars
leaves us doubting just what shines for whom?
** Associate Professor of Law, Temple University Law School; Co-Director, Cyberspace
Law Institute. dpost@vm.temple.edu.
*** Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering; Founder, Counsel Connect. david.johnson@
counsel.com.
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transaction-the amount of disclosure required, say, of someone
offering goods or services for sale, the behaviors that constitute
actionable "fraud," the conditions under which a transaction can be
rescinded, and the like? Which of the many plausibly applicable
bodies of copyright law do we consult to determine whether a
hyperlink on a World Wide Web page located on a server in France
and constructed by a Filipino citizen, which points to a server in
Brazil that contains material protected by German and French (but
not Brazilian) copyright law, which is downloaded to a server in the
United States and reposted to a Usenet newsgroup for worldwide
distribution, constitutes a remediable infringement of copyright? To
whose trademark law should we turn in order to resolve the question
of whether registration of an Internet domain name, using a sequence
of characters protected as a trademark under the law of some
jurisdictions but not others, is a wrongful act subject to penalty?1
It is no longer controversial to assert that these are difficult
questions, 2 providing, at least, a wealth of wonderful exam
1. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders-The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) [hereinafter Johnson & Post, Law and Borders];
David R. Johnson & David G. Post, The New "Civic Virtue" of the Internet, in THE EMERGING
INTERNET 23 (1998) [hereinafter Johnson & Post, The New "Civic Virtue"]; David G. Post,
Governing Cyberspace, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 155 (1996); David G. Post, The "Unsettled Paradox":
The Internet, the State, and the Consent of the Governed, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 521
(1998) [hereinafter Post, The "Unsettled Paradox"]. These papers are all available on-line at
http://www.cli.org and http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost.html.
We have been (fairly) chided for being insufficiently precise in distinguishing between our
descriptive and normative claims in earlier work. See Lawrence Lessig, The Zones of
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1403, 1407 (1996) (commenting on Johnson & Post, Law and
Borders, supra, and suggesting that "[t]o argue that real space law should leave cyberspace
alone one needs a normative argument-an argument about why it is good or right to leave
cyberspace alone"); id. at 1411 ("[I]f the argument for deference [to the emergent rules of online communities themselves] that Johnson and Post here beg is a normative argument, we must
say something more about the normative attractiveness of the world that cyberspace will be.").
Although the claim that we argued that "real space law should leave cyberspace alone" is
somewhat overstated, Lessig's main point is well-taken, and we offer the current paper in the
spirit of constructive engagement with his critique.
2. There is no shortage of writing about the novel jurisdictional issues posed by Internet
transactions. See, e.g., Richard H. Acker, Choice-of-Law Questions in Cyberfraud, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 437; Curtis A. Bradley, TerritorialIntellectualProperty Rights in an Age of Globalism,
37 VA. J. INT'L L. 505, 510-19 (1997); Dan L. Burk, Federalismin Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV.
1095 (1996) [hereinafter Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace]; Dan L. Burk, Patents in Cyberspace:
Territoriality and Infringement on Global Computer Networks, 68 TuL. L. REV. 1 (1993);
Matthew R. Burnstein, Conflicts on the Net: Choice of Law in Transnational Cyberspace, 29
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75 (1996); William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying
Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 197 (1995); James
Alexander French & Rafael X. Zahralddin, The Difficulty of Enforcing Laws in the
ExtraterritorialInternet, 1 NEXUS J. OPINION 99 (1996), available in LEXIS, Lawrev Library,
Allrev File; Alexander Gigante, Ice Patch on the Information Superhighway: Foreign Liability
for Domestically Created Content, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 523 (1996); Jane C.
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hypotheticals for courses in Civil Procedure, Conflict of Laws, or
International Law. But we would assert (perhaps somewhat more

controversially) that they are more fundamentally troublesome than
that. Physical and geographical constraints-on the effectiveness of
action and on the exercise of physical power, on the relationship
between causes and effects and the intensity of connections of all

kinds between individuals, on the ability to mark boundaries that
delineate legally-significant actors from one another-are deeply
rooted in our day-to-day experience in the world of atoms. Like

other "laws of nature"-gravity, entropy, the conservation of mass
and energy, and so on-they undergird our legal systems in a most

fundamental way; we would, obviously, think very differently about
any number of legal regimes and legal questions were we living in a

gravityless or frictionless world.3 But we need pay little attention to

these fundamental constraints in order to analyze and understand
those regimes and questions; precisely because they are invariant
across the entire legally-relevant universe they can be entirely
ignored, and we may cheerfully leave questions about the design of
legal systems in a world where mass and energy are not conserved for

contemplation by writers of science fiction.
But the physical constraints of distance and geography are no
longer invariant across the legal universe. One corner of that
universe -cyberspace -is creating a realm of human interaction in
Ginsburg, Copyright Without Borders? Choice of Forum and Choice of Law for Copyright
Infringement in Cyberspace, 15 CARDozO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 153 (1997); David Nimmer, Brains
and Other Paraphernaliaof the DigitalAge, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (1996); Henry H. Perritt,
Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. REv. 1 (1996); Brad A. Slutsky, Jurisdiction over
Commerce on the Internet (last modified June 6, 1997) <http://www.kslaw.com/menu/
jurisdic.htm>.
3. Professor Lessig has written extensively on the important (but generally
unacknowledged) ways that "laws of nature" act as regulatory constraints and on the ways that
cyberspace regulation will need to re-conceptualize the role of these natural laws. See, e.g.,
Lawrence Lessig, The Constitution of Code: Limitations on Choice-Based Critiques of
Cyberspace Regulation, 5 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 181, 181 (1997) [hereinafter Lessig,
Constitution of Code] (describing the three interacting forces through which social control can
be achieved-law, social norms, and laws of nature: "That I can not see through walls is a
constraint on my ability to snoop. That I can not read your mind is a constraint on my ability to
know whether you are telling me the truth. That I can not lift large objects is a constraint on my
ability to steal. Nature, in these ways, constrains behavior. Nature, in this sense, regulates.");
Lawrence Lessig, Reading the Constitution in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 869, 875 (1996)
(suggesting that the absence of physical constraints in cyberspace makes regulation more
complex than in the world of atoms: "[T]he problem of cyberspace for constitutional law [is
that] it leaves us without constraint enough; ... we are, vis-A-vis the laws of nature in this new
space, gods; and the problem with being gods is that we must choose."); see also Lessig,
Constitutionof Code, supra, at 181 (noting that while most "regulation talk" focuses on law and,
in recent years, social norms, "modem legal scholarship has not thought much about how nature
regulates").
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which those constraints are disappearing entirely, in which physical
location and physical space are becoming both indeterminate and
functionally irrelevant. There, physical proximity is no longer a prime

determinant of the relationship between cause and effect in human
interaction, connections of all kinds between individuals are no longer

formed by location-dependent processes, and boundaries drawn in
physical space can no longer be easily discerned (if they can be
discerned at all).4
Does any of this raise truly new questions about the regulation of

human behavior? Perhaps not-it is, after all, hardly clear that there
are any such questions regarding human affairs.
But an
understanding of how interactions on the global network are to be
governed, and how law-making sovereignty in regard to these
interactions is to be defined, will, we believe, require some rather
creative thinking about a problem-the role played by these

locational constraints in legal systems-that has been (largely)
ignored until now.5
4. See, e.g., Burk, Federalism in Cyberspace,supra note 2, at 1098-99 (because the Internet
protocols call for "geographically extended sharing of scattered resources," users "may
therefore be completely unaware where the resource being accessed is, in fact, physically
located. So insensitive is the network to geography, that it is frequently impossible to determine
the physical location of a resource or user [because] [s]uch information is unimportant to the
network's function . . . and the network's design thus makes little provision for geographic
discernment."
(footnote omitted)); A. Michael Froomkin, The Internet as a Source of
Regulatory Arbitrage,in BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE 129, 142-55 (Brian Kahin & Charles Nesson
eds., 1997) (Internet users, "as long as they share a common language and a reasonably rapid
connection," will generally be "indifferent to the physical location of those with whom they
communicate," allowing them to engage in "regulatory arbitrage"); Johnson & Post, Law and
Borders, supra note 1, at 1370-72 (describing the a-geographical nature of cyberspace); Joel R.
Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making in Cyberspace, in BORDERS IN
CYBERSPACE, supra, at 84, 85-87 (describing the destruction of territorial and substantive
borders in cyberspace).
This idea is beginning to percolate through the judiciary. See, e.g., American Libraries
Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The unique nature of the Internet
highlights the likelihood that a single actor might be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and
even outright inconsistent regulation by states that the actor never intended to reach and
possibly was unaware were being accessed. Typically, states' jurisdictional limits are related to
geography; geography, however, is a virtually meaningless construct on the Internet."); Digital
Equip. Corp. v. Altavista Tech., Inc., 960 F. Supp. 456, 462-63 (D. Ma. 1997) ("The Internet has
no territorial boundaries ....
Physical boundaries typically have framed legal boundaries, in
effect creating signposts that warn that we will be required after crossing to abide by different
rules. To impose traditional territorial concepts on the commercial uses of the Internet has
dramatic implications, opening the Web user up to inconsistent regulations throughout fifty
states, indeed, throughout the globe." (citation omitted)).
5. As Richard Ford has written:
There is no self-conscious legal conception of political space. Most legal and
political theory focuses almost exclusively on the relationship between individuals and
the state. Judges, policymakers, and scholars analogize decentralized governments and
associations either to individuals, when considered vis-A-vis centralized government, or
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This is, to put it mildly, a big subject; first principles have an
annoying tendency to require thinking at a fairly high level of
abstraction. We have chosen to begin by posing a relatively simple
problem-solving problem that we call the "Gardener's Dilemma":
How can one find a "good," or perhaps even the "best," configuration
of a complex system (in this case, a garden), a collection of individual
elements (plants) whose behavior (however measured) is dependent
upon the behavior of many others within the system? 6 This problem
is a close analogue of many problems in law and social policy, which
often call for a comparison of alternate future configurations of
complex social systems and a choice among them.7 The question
"How do we solve problems like the Gardener's Dilemma?" is
therefore of some general interest-as is the well-known observation
that many problems of this sort are computationally intractable,
incapable of true solution by any known methods. 8 Legal theory
would, we believe, be enriched by more focused consideration of this
conundrum, by paying additional attention to the study of various
algorithms derived from the study of "complex adaptive systems" that
can successfully operate on problems of this kind. We describe one
such algorithm-what Stuart Kauffman calls "patching," the division
of a system into non-overlapping but coupled self-optimizing partsthat can, in certain circumstances, efficiently identify better
configurations of complex systems (even if they can never be
guaranteed to reach the optimal result). 9 This patching algorithm
bears a striking resemblance to well-known models of "competitive
federalism," and we describe some experimental results that suggest
that one feature of patched systems-the "congruence" between
inter-individual spillover effects and the boundaries of these decisionto the state, when considered vis-A-vis their own members, but consider the
development, population and demarcation of space to be irrelevant....
Legal boundaries are often ignored because they are imagined to be either the
product of aggregated individual choices or the administratively necessary
segmentation of centralized governmental power....
...[W]e have not one, but two tacit conceptions of space-space as opaque and
space as transparent. On the one hand, we often implicitly see political space as
natural and fixed. On the other hand, and often at the same time, we see political
space as irrelevant.
Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1857-59 (1994).
6. See infra section I.A.
7. See infra section I.B.
8. See infra section I.C.
9. See infra Part II.
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making patches-is a critical determinant of the effectiveness of
patching as a problem-solving device. 10 We conclude with some
speculation as to the implications of these findings for the problem of
Internet "governance," and for existing models of federalism and
related governance structures.
I. THE ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS

A. The Gardener'sDilemma
Imagine a garden consisting of many different plants of many
different species and a gardener who seeks to maximize some variable
over the garden as a whole-total yield, for example. The gardener
faces a particular decision: whether, with respect to each individual
plant, to prune it back or leave it unpruned. How can our gardener
find the "best" combination of pruned and unpruned plants, the
configuration that will produce the most luxuriant growth overall?
The garden, we assume, has the following general characteristics.
First, individuals are heterogeneous; the relationship between an
individual's state (pruned or unpruned) and its growth is different for
each plant; for some plants, pruning will increase growth (by reducing
the diversion of scarce nutrients, water, sunlight, etc., into
unnecessary foliage), while for others the "shock" of pruning will
cause them to grow less vigorously. This heterogeneity may be due to
differences among species -asparagus plants may react differently to
pruning, on average, than tomatoes-and to differences between
individuals of the same species (because of differences in overall
health or vigor or genetic constitution, for example).
Second, there are substantial spillover effects between and among
the individual plants, by which we mean that each individual's growth
can be affected-positively or negatively-by the condition and
growth of other plants.12 The condition of an individual's neighbors
10. See id.
11. See infra Part III.
12. The notion of a spillover effect is similar to the familiar concept of an "externality." In
its most common usage, an "externality" describes a spillover effect that has the additional
characteristic that it is not the subject of a market transaction. See generally ANDREAS A.
PAPANDREOU, EXTERNALITY AND INSTITUTIONS 13 (1994) ("A History of the Notion of
Externality") (summarizing the various usages of the term within economics); Harold Demsetz,
Towards a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347, 348 (1967) ("Externality is an
ambiguous concept.... What converts a harmful or beneficial effect into an externality is that
the cost of bringing the effect to bear on the decisions of one or more of the interacting persons
is too high to make it worthwhile ... "); Walter P. Heller & David A. Starrett, On the Nature of
Externalities, in THEORY AND MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES 9, 10 (Steven
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will help determine, for example, the amount of sunlight that is likely
to penetrate through to any individual plant, the amount of nutrients
likely to remain in the immediate proximity in the soil, and the like,

all of which will in turn affect the growth of that individual.
Third, each plant's response to being in one state or another
(pruned/unpruned) is endogenously determined, i.e., a function of the
state of some number other plants. For example, a plant's response

to being pruned may depend on whether it is in an area of high or low
sunlight; in the former, it may grow more vigorously if unpruned
(which will allow it to take better advantage of the available sunlight),
while with less sunlight available it may do better if unnecessary
foliage is pruned away (or vice versa in some cases). And whether an

individual plant is in an area of high or low sunlight in turn depends
on the state (pruned/unpruned) of its neighbors.
Let us state this problem a bit more formally. The garden is a
system consisting of some number (N) of individual elementsindividual plants. Each element can be in one of only two possible
states-for purposes of our problem, pruned or unpruned. 13 The

garden can contain at any time some elements in one state and some
in the other; we will call each particular combination of pruned and
unpruned plants a different configuration of the system. 14 Because
the elements of this system can be in one of only two possible states,
we can represent any system configuration by a string of ls and Os,

where a "1" indicates that a particular element is in the first
("pruned") state, a "0" the opposite, or by a diagram like Figure 1.

A.Y. Lin ed., 1976) (an externality exists where "the private economy lacks sufficient incentives
to create a potential market in some good and the nonexistence of this market results in losses
in Pareto efficiency"). Our use of the term "spillover effect" corresponds to what Andreas
Papandreou calls the "broadest view of externality": a "general interdependence or any and all
effects of others' actions on an agent." PAPANDREOU, supra, at 61. To avoid further muddying
these muddy waters, we think it best to use the term "spillovers" to describe these inter-element
effects.
13. We could define a richer "state space," if we wished, with more than two possible states
for each element, but that would merely complicate the discussion that follows without changing
the qualitative conclusions we are drawing from analysis of these systems.
14. In any system with N elements, each of which can take one of S possible states, there
are SN different system configurations. A 10 plant garden, in which each plant can be in one of
two states, can take on 21=1024 different configurations. Each configuration can be thought of
as defining a single point in N-dimensional space-the "system space"-the axes of which are
defined by the possible states of each of the N elements.

[Vol. 73:1055
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FIGURE 1
Visual depiction of a 100-element system organized, for convenience, into a square
lattice. Open circles denote elements that are in one state ("pruned"), closed circles
We can also represent this

denote elements in the other state ("unpruned").

configuration by a 100-element binary string viz. [0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0010, 1, 0, ... ].

0 0
00

0 0 0
0 0 00

00o~o.o~o0
0
0
0
0

0

0
00

0

0
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0
0

0 0
0 0
0 0
00

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

Each element's contribution to the system variable we are

seeking to maximize is a function of both its own state and, because of
inter-individual spillover effects, the state of some number of other

elements; that is, a change in one element's state (from 0 to 1, or
unpruned to pruned, or vice versa) affects both its own contribution
and the contribution of a number of other plants to the overall yield
of the garden. Conversely, each plant's contribution to overall yield

is a function of both its own state and the state of a number of other
plants in the garden.
Each configuration of the system produces some value for the
system variable that we are seeking to maximize, and it is helpful to

visualize a graph plotting the value of this system variable (aggregate
yield in our example) against each different configuration of
individual states (pruned and unpruned) that the system can be in.
Such a map of the way that this variable changes as the states of
individual elements change produces a kind of "landscape," a multidimensional terrain that rises to "peaks" of high yield in certain
configurations and descends into "valleys" of low yield for other

configurations of the elements. 15

15. This idea of a "yield landscape" for the garden derives from the concept of a "fitness
landscape," introduced by the population geneticist Sewall Wright to describe the distribution
of the biological fitness-reproductive success-over the space defined by all possible genotypes
(combinations of genetic material) within an evolving population. See STUART A. KAUFFMAN,
THE ORIGINS OF ORDER: SELF-ORGANIZATION AND SELECTION IN EVOLUTION 33-120 (1993)
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[hereinafter KAUFFMAN, ORIGINS OF ORDER]. The process of evolutionary adaptation is
conceived of as a kind of "hill climbing via fitter mutants toward some local or global optimum,"
the process by which the genotype wanders over this fitness landscape in genotype space. See
id. at 33; see also STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE 149-89 (1995) [hereinafter
KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE] (describing the landscape metaphor in detail).
To visualize such a "yield landscape," consider a simple, 2-element system. Each element
has some contribution to overall yield in each of the two possible states; for example, the yield
function for element X may be:
Yield Function, element X
State
Yield Contribution
0
0.211
1
0.879
And for element Y:
Yield Function, element Y
State
0
1

Yield Contribution
0.505
0.951

The aggregate yield for the system as a whole is thus given by the following table:
System
Configuration
0,0
0,1
1,0

S_

1,1

Aggregate
Yield
0.716 [0.211+0.5051
1.162 [0.211+0.951]
1.384 [0.879+0.505]
1 1.830 [0.879+0.951]

We can plot this relationship on a graph with N+1=3 axes, with the vertical axis
representing aggregate yield and the state of each of the N elements along N other axes. Each
of the four possible system configurations can be represented by a single point in this N+1
dimensional space, and the "yield landscape" consists of the "height" of the various points on
the fitness axis:

=I
Z

Note that this system has a yield "peak" at (1,1) and a yield "valley" at (0,0).
Unfortunately, because the "yield landscape" for an N-element system requires N+1
dimensions, it is impossible to actually display the fitness landscape graph for any system with
N>2; conceptually, however, the idea of a plotted landscape can be applied to systems of any
dimensionality.
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The gardener's dilemma, then, is to find a way to identify the
system configuration- the combination of individual state settings for
each of the plants -that produces the maximum yield of the garden as
a whole, the highest point on the yield landscape. How can the
gardener do so?
B. The Law and the Garden
Before addressing that question, we should pause to consider the
relevance of the Gardener's Dilemma to the Internet or to legal
theory (the subject matters of this symposium). Why might we be
interested in the way that the Gardener's Dilemma is (or is not)
solved?
The problem posed by the Gardener's Dilemma is a highly
general one, frequently encountered in the law. To decide whether a
particular activity should be encouraged, discouraged, ignored, or
prohibited by a legally-enforceable rule of some kind, we often ask
some variant of the following question: "How will an individual's (or
group's) performance of some activity (change of state) affect some
measure of well-being (overall yield) within the population to which
that individual belongs (the garden)?"
Consider the following entirely typical example, drawn from a
recent case in which a federal court was asked to decide whether
copyright law prohibits or permits college and university professors to
photocopy articles from books or journals for distribution in
"coursepacks" to their classes without authorization from the author
or copyright holder. 16 The relevant statutory provisions can be easily
identified: the production of coursepacks constitutes an activity"reproduc[ing] ...copyrighted work[s] in copies"T-that is squarely

within the exclusive rights of copyright holders; at the same time, the
statute excuses "the fair use of ...copyrighted work[s]," defined to

include such uses as "reproduction in copies... for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
Does
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research." 18
or
not?
this
category
fall
into
coursepack production
Given indeterminate statutory language 19 and no direct
16. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Serv., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1383 (6th
Cir. 1996) (en banc).
17. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1994).
18. Id. § 107.
19. The statutory language governing the "fair use" inquiry is notoriously-though hardly
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precedent on point,20 the court looked, appropriately enough, to the
purposes of copyright law (and the fair use exception) more generally
in making its decision: Which rule will, in the constitutional phrase,
best "promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts"? 21 Which
rule will best "stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good"? 22 Will placing this activity outside the copyright holder's
exclusive rights increase the production of works of authorship (by
allowing for greater dissemination of existing works among scholars
and students), or will declaring this activity to be within those
exclusive rights stimulate increased production of such works (by
providing additional financial incentive for producers and/or
publishers)?
As it turned out, the court was deeply divided on this question.
A majority of the court was of the latter view:
[T]he district court was not persuaded that the creation of new
works of scholarship would be stimulated by depriving publishers
of the revenue stream derived from the sale of permissions.
Neither are we. On the contrary, it seems to us, the destruction of
this revenue stream can only have a deleterious effect upon the
incentive to publish academic writings. 23
To the dissenters, on the other hand, the Copyright Act's
"laudable societal objectives.., to stimulate production of...
original works for the benefit of the whole nation" will be "thwarted"
unless professors were permitted to engage freely in this activity:24
The majority's strict reading of the fair use doctrine promises to
hinder scholastic progress nationwide. By charging permission fees
on this kind of job, publishers will pass on expenses to colleges and
universities that will, of course, pass such fees on to students.
Students may also be harmed if added expenses and delays cause
professors to opt against creating such specialized anthologies for
uniquely-indeterminate; one sitting federal judge has called the four statutory fair use factors
the "fuzzball factors." See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 208. Indeed, the fact that eight judges of the Sixth Circuit found that the
challenged use in this case was not fair use notwithstanding express reference in the statutory
provisions to "multiple copies for classroom use" testifies to just how indeterminate the
language of the statute is.
20. The Princeton University Press case was a case of first impression in the Sixth Circuit.
See 99 F.3d at 1394 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
22. Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1391 (the "ultimate aim [of copyright law] is ... to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.... When technological change has
rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic
purpose." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 1393 (Martin, J., dissenting).
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their courses. Even if professors attempt to reproduce the benefits
of such a customized education, the added textbook cost to
students is likely to be prohibitive. 25
Our point is not to choose sides in this particular debate, but to
point out how similar the question all were asking-how will a
prohibition on uncompensated copying in this context affect the
production of scholarly works, and thereby the general welfare? -is
to the Gardener's Dilemma. Deciding whether or not copyright law
should permit professors to engage in this conduct presupposes an
ability to say something about the way in which different
"configurations" (of copying and no copying) within this system affect
both the production of creative works and aggregate social wellbeing, something about the shape of a "well-being landscape" that is
defined over different configurations of copying and no copying.
Performance (or non-performance) of this activity surely has
heterogeneous effects on individual well-being.
Inter-individual
spillover effects are certainly nontrivial; a professor's decision to
photocopy a particular article, for example, affects the well-being
(again, however one might define it) of her students, of the author of
the works involved, 6 of other authors and potential authors, 27 of the
25. Id. at 1393-94 (Martin, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1394-97 (Merritt, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the "essence of copyright is the promotion of learning," which will not be fostered
by the majority's reading); id. at 1397-1411 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (the "more reasonable
presumption" is not that "the practice of excerpting some materials harms the authors' rightful
market and secures a benefit only to the excerpters" but that "society benefits from the
additional circulation of ideas in the educational setting," and "speculat[ing]" that the
defendants' copying either has "no impact on [the] incentives to authors to create new works,
and may even provide authors incentive to write, thereby advancing the progress of science and
the arts").
26. The effect of copying by any individual professor on the author's well-being may be a
complicated function of the context in which the copying takes place. If the author derives
compensation from the sale of copies of the work in question-as generally assumed in most
analyses of copyright principles, see, e.g., Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in
Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 221-22 (discussing the incentives for production of
intellectual property that are unaffected by widespread copying, such as the "incentive for
university professors.., to achieve recognition though widespread distribution of their scholarly
work"); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 17
J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 327 (1989) ("[T]he expected return [for a new work to be created is]
typically, and we shall assume exclusively, [derived] from the sale of copies.")-coursepack
copying may reduce the author's well-being. Many authors, however, and especially those in
markets with significant reputational components, may derive compensation for creating new
works in other ways, e.g., the reputational benefits that may accrue from wide distribution of
copies of their work. See id. at 331 (observing that many authors derive substantial benefits
from publication over and above income derived from the sale of copies, e.g., "a higher salary
for a professor who publishes than for one who does not, or greater consulting income"
(footnote omitted)); Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can't "Just Say
Yes" to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 237, 246-51 (1997) (suggesting that the current
array of incentives may be sufficient to generate high-quality creative works on the Internet
notwithstanding the inability of many producers to charge for copies of their work). See
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employees and stockholders of the publishing house that published

the author's work, of the copy shop that receives the copying revenue,
and so on. And the richness of these couplings and interconnections

means that the effect of copying on any individual's well-being is at
least partially endogenously determined, dependent upon the copying
activities of others (i.e., the "state" of other "elements" of the

system).8 If, like the gardener, we are looking for those particular
generally David Friedman, Standards as Intellectual Property:An Economic Approach, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 1109, 1115-16 (1994) (discussing various factors that may influence the
"supply curve" for producers of intellectual property); Peter S. Menell, The Challenges of
Reforming Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2644,
2647 (1994) (arguing that product marketing, support, and reputation can be significant forces
to protect market share notwithstanding widespread copying); Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual
Property:A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 287-302
(1989) (surveying the incentives that may exist for the production of intellectual property in the
absence of prohibitions against copying).
27. A central tenet of traditional copyright theory, of course, is the assumption that the
ability to copy without compensation has a negative impact on the incentives of future
authors-that the professor's copying, in some small measure, adversely affects those
considering the investment of time and energy into the production of similar works in the
future.
28. There are innumerable ways in which the relative costs and benefits of copying or no
copying for any individual professor are endogenously determined by the "system
configuration" itself, i.e., the state (copy/no copy) of others. Benefits derived from any
particular act of copying are reduced to the extent a professor's students themselves are in the
"copy" state (i.e., have made copies of the works in question, thereby obviating the need for the
coursepack), as well as to the extent that those students can easily and at low cost place
themselves in that state by obtaining copies of the work(s) in question from others who are
themselves in the "copy" state (e.g., from others who have placed the materials in an easily
accessible place such as a World Wide Web site). Over time, the "configuration" of
professors-the distribution of "copy/no copy" states among this group-may generate a
number of different responses by authors and publishers that in turn affect the benefits that
professors receive from changing their state with regard to copying. For example, if professors
are generally in the "no copy" state (whether because of a copyright rule prohibiting
professorial coursepack production or otherwise), that alters the incentives of authors seeking
wider distribution of their work to students to find alternate distributional channels (thereby
reducing the benefit each professor receives from copying still further). Alternatively,
widespread professorial production of coursepacks may increase the supply of copying services
in and around universities, which may have the effect of allowing students to produce their own
copies of required articles at lower cost, or it may stimulate other institutional responses that
alter the professorial cost-benefit calculus in other ways (such as collecting societies acting on
the authors' or publishers' behalf). See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, ContractingInto Liability Rules:
Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996)
(describing emergence of collecting societies as a response to initially inefficient property rights
entitlements). In other words, the configuration of "copy/no copy" across university professors
defines the problem that others are trying to solve, and the responses of those others alter, in
turn, the problem the professors are trying to solve. And finally, just to square the circle of
endogenous effects, the configuration of "copy/no copy" across this system itself affects the
likelihood that the copying will be deemed "fair use" (further altering the costs and benefits of
any individual professor's copying activities) in a number of ways. First, the incidence of
coursepack copying affects (a) the likelihood that any single instance of such copying can be
detected, which affects in turn (b) both the (static) costs of copying facing any individual
professor and the (dynamic) likelihood that any monitoring and licensing scheme will be
undertaken by authors, publishers, or the state, which affects in turn (c) whether the copying
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configurations of performance and nonperformance that are "better"
than others from the perspective of the system as a whole, how can
we find them?
This copyright illustration is hardly exceptional; while we would
not suggest that all normative legal questions take this form, we do
think that a large number of problems in legal policy share its
essential features. It is of no small interest, then, to see if we can
answer the question with which we began: How do we solve the
Gardener's Dilemma? How can we identify "better" or "worse"
configurations of such systems? How do we (or the judges of the
Sixth Circuit) decide whether professorial production of coursepacks
will or will not stimulate scholarly creativity and thereby better
promote the "Progress of Science and the useful Arts"?
C. Solving the Gardener'sDilemma
Notwithstanding the fact that the Gardener's Dilemma does not
appear to be a particularly difficult problem, the manner in which
problems of this kind are solved-or whether, indeed, they are
solved-is not at all well understood. The intuition involved here is
relatively straightforward. Imagine that you are trying to solve the
Gardener's Dilemma one plant at a time; that is, moving one plant at
a time across the garden, you determine whether pruning the plant in
question would increase or decrease the yield of the garden, you mark
the plant accordingly, and then you move on to the next. The growth
of the first plant you encounter is a function (by our spillover
assumption) of the condition of some others; thus, solving the
Problem of the First Plant -determining whether pruning will cause it
to grow more, or less, luxuriantly-therefore requires knowledge
about the state of those other plants. But the state of those others
will depend on the state of the first plant; the decision you are making
now (for plant 1) changes the conditions defining the problem that
you will be trying to solve later (i.e., whether or not to prune plant X).
falls into the fair use category. Compare Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387 n.4 (existence of
an "established license fee system is highly relevant" to fair use determination), and American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 931 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[I]t is sensible that a
particular unauthorized use should be considered 'more fair' when there is no ready market or
means to pay for the use, while such an unauthorized use should be considered 'less fair' when
there is a ready market or means to pay for the use."), with Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at
1407-09 (Ryan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the circular nature of this logic). And second, there is
the additional consideration that if widespread coursepack production without compensation to
authors is the norm, courts may be more likely to deem such copying "reasonable" and within
the fair use exception than otherwise.

1998]

It seems
problem
different
number

"CHAOS PREVAILING ON EVERY CONTINENT"

impossible to solve one without solving the other. The
has a kind of nightmarish recursiveness about it; each
configuration of the system-and there are an enormous
of such configurations 29-seems to present a different

problem to be solved and determining the system-wide maximum

seems to require solving all of them simultaneously. The system, in
Stuart Kauffman's words, is "caught in a web of conflicting

constraints" in which "each small part of the system affects other
parts of the whole system," and "changing [the state of a single
element] ... will have effects that ripple throughout the system. ' 30 A

small change in the state of some elements may, by virtue of these
complex cross-couplings between elements, have large impacts on the
yield of the system as a whole.3 1
29. See supra note 14. A small (N=100) system with two possible states for each element
(S=2) can take any one of 2"0 possible configurations-a number approaching in magnitude the
number of elementary particles in the known universe.
30. KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 15, at 173. Lon Fuller called
these kinds of problems "polycentric" (following Michael Polanyi's use of that term in THE
LOGIC OF LIBERTY: REFLECTIONS AND REJOINDERS (1951)) and offered the following
example:
Some months ago a wealthy lady by the name of Timken died in New York leaving a
valuable, but somewhat miscellaneous, collection of paintings to the Metropolltan
Museum and the National Gallery "in equal shares," her will indicating no particular
apportionment. When the will was probated the judge remarked something to the
effect that the parties seemed to be confronted with a real problem.... What makes
this problem of effecting an equal division of the paintings a polycentric task? It lies in
the fact that the disposition of any single painting has implications for the proper
disposition of every otherpainting. If it gets the Renoir, the Gallery may be less eager
for the Cezanne but all the more eager for the Bellows, etc.
Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394 (1978)
(emphasis added) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication]. Fuller gave other examples of polycentric problems of this kind, from setting
prices and wages within a managed economy to produce a proper flow of goods, where "[a] rise
in the price of aluminum may affect in varying degrees the demand for, and therefore the
proper price of, thirty kinds of steel, twenty kinds of plastics, an infinitude of woods, other
metals, etc." and where "[e]ach of these separate effects may have its own complex
repercussions in the economy," id., to redrawing the boundaries of election districts, assigning
the players of a football team to their respective positions, and allocating air routes among
cities. See Lon L. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 1960 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L LAW
1, 3 [hereinafter Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law]. As Fuller himself noted, these
problems are ubiquitous inthe law. See id. at 7 ("1 hope I shall not appear to be overworking
the concept of polycentricity if I say that all community is polycentric in nature, as indeed are all
living relationships.").
We thank Professors Jeffrey Dunoff and Michael Libonati for pointing out this theme in
Fuller's work to us.
31. Fitness landscapes in complex, interconnected systems will, in other words, generally be
extremely rugged; changing the state of a single element in such a system-taking a single "step"
in the multi-dimensional system space-may affect the fitness of many (or, at the limit, all)
other system elements, and can, as a result, produce dramatic changes in aggregate system
fitness. Thus, aggregate system fitness may be highly sensitive to small changes in the states of
the individual elements; points on the landscape that are "close together," i.e., separated in
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You might think, as you laboriously make your way across the

garden, that there must be sophisticated mathematical techniques that
can be brought to bear on this problem (and you might take some

comfort from knowing that such techniques exist, even if you are not
yourself competent to utilize them). But, interestingly, that is not the
case. There is a rich literature, primarily (but not exclusively) in the
fields of computer science and economics, demonstrating that a wide
range of problems characterized by the features we have given to our
endogenously
elements,
individual
garden -heterogeneous
determined individual responses to changes in state, and inter-

magnitude - are
of
substantial
effects
spillover
element
"computationally intractable"; they are effectively insoluble by any
known techniques by virtue of the fact that the number of discrete
computational steps required to compute a solution increases
exponentially with the "size" of the problem, the "dimensionality" of
the system space over which the problem is defined.32 In the "worst

case"-one in which the interconnections among elements are
sufficiently rich and complex such that each element's state affects the
growth of all other elements in the system and vice versa-we may be
able to solve for the highest point on the system's "yield landscape"
only by searching over the entire configuration space; by the simple
but inexorable logic of exponential scaling, this is impossible for even

relatively small systems, for the number of possible configurations
33
becomes unimaginably vast very quickly as N increases.

What we have, in any complex interconnected system, is a
genuinely hard problem: the system can take any one of an
astronomical number of different configurations and may, via the
multi-dimensional space by only one or a small number of state changes, may have very
different fitness values, producing a jagged shape to the fitness landscape. See generally
KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 15, at 173-206 (a non-technical
description of the relationship between conflicting constraints in interconnected systems and the
ruggedness of their fitness landscapes); KAUFFMAN, ORIGINS OF ORDER, supra note 15, at 33120 (a more technical discussion of the structure and biological implications of rugged fitness
landscapes).
32. Professor Rust provides an excellent overview of the development of "impossibility
theorems" in these various disciplines. See John Rust, Dealing with the Complexity of Economic
Calculations, in FUNDAMENTAL LIMITS TO KNOWLEDGE IN ECONOMICS (J.F. Traub & S.N.
Durlauf eds., forthcoming 1998), available on-line (last modified Oct. 17, 1997) <http://
Rust defines "computationally
econwpa.wustl.edu/eprints/comp/papers/9610/9610002.abs>.
intractable" problems as those "for which the lower bound on the computation cost increases
exponentially with the problem dimension." Id. Examples of problems exhibiting this "curse of
dimensionality" include the "traveling salesman" problem familiar to students of operations
research, computation of equilibrium solutions to multi-person games, and calculation of the
fundamental "Walrasian auction" equilibrium in microeconomics. See id.
33. See supra note 29.

19981

"CHAOS PREVAILING ON EVERY CONTINENT"

"ripple effects" of changes throughout the system, respond to small

changes of the state of those elements with large changes in whatever
system-wide variable we seek to measure. We are looking for the
highest point in the landscape defined over such a system, but can be

assured of finding it only if we search the entire state space, an
impossible task.34 This "curse of dimensionality ' '35 is not some odd bit
of mathematical trivia; 36 it represents a substantial-and quite
possibly a fundamental-constraint on our ability to solve a wide
34. This is not, we emphasize, because we do not have enough information about the
relationships between the elements or about the manner in which an individual's state affects its
own utility function and the utility of others, nor is it because the values of the relevant variables
are somehow stochastically determined. Even when the Gardener's Dilemma is fully specified
and deterministic-when we know, in advance, all determinants of each element's fitness and
the way that each individual plant will react to being pruned or being left unpruned, and the way
that each individual plant would be affected were the state of its neighbors to change-our
problem with respect to finding the configuration that produces optimal yield for the system as a
whole remains. The indeterminacy is a function of the inherent complexity of the system and
the existence of conflicting constraints among the individual elements.
35. See Rust, supra note 32.
36. The impossibility of computing "equilibrium solutions" to the problems posed by any
modern economic system was central to Friedrich Hayek's attack on the feasibility of central
economic planning-surely one of the least trivial contributions to one of the least trivial
intellectual debates of this century. Hayek's views are summarized in his 1974 Nobel Memorial
Lecture. See Friedrich August von Hayek, The Pretence of Knowledge, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 3
(1989) (reprint of Nobel lecture); see also F.A. HAYEK, STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS
AND ECONOMICS 27 (1967) ("The multiplicity of even the minimum of distinct elements
required to produce (and therefore also of the minimum number of data required to explain) a
complex phenomenon of a certain kind creates problems which dominate the disciplines
concerned with such phenomena . . . . The chief difficulty . . . becomes one of in fact
ascertaining all the data determining a particular manifestation of the phenomenon in question,
a difficulty which is often insurmountable in practice and sometimes even an absolute one."); id.
at 34 ("One of the chief results so far achieved by theoretical work in [the studies of society]
seems to me to be the demonstration that here individual events regularly depend on so many
concrete circumstancesthat we shall never in fact be in a position to ascertain them all; and that in
consequence not only the ideal of prediction and control must largely remain beyond our reach, ..
. The very insight which theory provides, for example, that almost any event in the course of a
man's life may have some effect on almost any of his future actions, makes it impossible that we
translate our theoretical knowledge into predictions of specific events. There is no justification
for the dogmatic belief that such translation must be possible if a science of these subjects is to
be achieved, and that workers in these sciences have merely not yet succeeded in what physics
has done, namely to discover simple relations between a few observables. If the theories which
we have yet achieved tell us anything, it is that no such simple regularities are to be expected."
(emphasis added)); id. at 39 ("Perhaps it is only natural that in the exuberance generated by the
successful advances of science the circumstances which limit our factual knowledge, and the
consequent boundaries imposed upon the applicability of theoretical knowledge, have been
rather disregarded. It is high time, however, that we take our ignorance more seriously.").
Herbert Simon's influential work on "satisficing" behavior was motivated by similar
concerns. See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, THE SCIENCES OF THE ARTIFICIAL 36 (2d ed. 1981)
("In the face of this complexity the real-world business firm turns to procedures that find good
enough answers to questions whose best answers are unknowable.
Thus normative
microeconomics, by showing real-world optimization to be impossible, demonstrates that
economic man is in fact a satisficer, a person who accepts 'good enough' alternatives, not
because he prefers less to more but because he has no choice.").
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range of problems, including, for example, those posed by any
modern economic system, 37 characterized by complex interdependen37. Rust summarizes much recent work suggesting that a wide range of economic problems
are computationally intractable. See Rust, supra note 32 (manuscript at 2-11).
Real economic problems are extremely high dimensional. For example if d refers to
the number of goods and services in the actual economy, then d is certainly as large as
one hundred thousand and probably is closer to several hundred million depending on
how narrowly we define a good or service. In many problems d will also be a function
of the number of agents, which is well over 5 billion if we view the planet as a single
integrated economy. To the extent that we want to compute a reasonably accurate
approximation to the competitive equilibrium solution.., and for realistic values of d,
the exponential complexity bounds . . . imply than an astronomical number of
calculations are required. The simple logic of exponential growth tells us that.., as d
increases the number of calculations quickly grows so large that the world's fastest
supercomputers would be unable to find [even] an approximate solution to the
problem in any reasonable period of time.
Id. (manuscript at 10); see also David Lane & Robert Maxfield, Foresight, Complexity, and
Strategy, in THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM 11169, 170 (W. Brian Arthur
et al. eds., 1997) (discussing the "combinatorial explosion of possible consequences" for many
economic problems). Traditional economic theory provides no way out of this intractability
dilemma (and does not purport to do so); as many have pointed out, conventional economic
theory cures this "curse of dimensionality," and renders large-scale models analytically
tractable, by assuming given and stable (rather than endogenously determined) individual
preferences. See Robert H. Frank, PositionalExternalities, in STRATEGY AND CHOICE 25, 44
(Richard J. Zeckhauser ed., 1991) (noting that "positional externalities" -decisions that have
"important effects not only for the person who [makes them], but also for the frame of
reference in which he and others operate"-are generally treated "in many economics texts as
though they were an isolated exception to a normal state of affairs in which choices affect only
the agents directly involved," and noting further that "the more we learn about them, the more
likely it seems that actions without external effects may be the real exceptions"); Herbert Gintis,
Welfare Criteria with Endogenous Preferences: The Economics of Education, 15 INT'L ECON.
REV. 415, 415 (1974) (neo-classical economic theory "takes preferences as either fixed, or
changing only in response to variables external to the model. In positive economics, the
formation of preferences is relegated to sociology or social psychology; and in welfare
economics, preference structures are among the fundamental, unexplained data"); John
Holland, The Global Economy as an Adaptive Process, in THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING
COMPLEX SYSTEM 117-18 (Philip W. Anderson et al. eds., 1988) (economic choices are
"determined by the interaction of many dispersed units acting in parallel [in which] [t]he action
of any given unit depends upon the state and actions of a limited number of other units,"
requiring a "substantial extension of traditional economics"); Steffen Huck, Trust, Treason, and
Trials: An Example of How the Evolution of Preferences Can Be Driven by Legal Institutions, 14
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 44 (1998) (reviewing notion that traditional economic theory "relies
crucially on the rational actor paradigm and the assumption of given and stable preferences...
as does the economic analysis of law"); Alan P. Kirman, The Economy as an Interactive System,
in THE ECONOMY AS AN EVOLVING COMPLEX SYSTEM II, supra, at 491-531 (discussing the
"logical and technical problems associated with standard economic models"); George J. Stigler
& Gary S. Becker, De Gustibus non Est Disputandum, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 76 (1977)
(summarizing, and justifying, economics' reliance on this assumption). This, in turn, has
generated a lively debate about the realism of such models. See, e.g., JON ELSTER, SOUR
GRAPES (1983); ROBIN HAHNEL & MICHAEL ALBERT, QUIET REVOLUTION IN WELFARE
ECONOMICS 141-202 (1990); Jane B. Baron & Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality:
Moral Critiques of Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 431 (1996);
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-BasedLegal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 4 (1994);
Gerald J. Postema, Liberty in Equality's Empire, 73 IOWA L. REV. 55, 86-87 (1987) (discussing
the "so-called problem of endogenous preferences and the threat it poses to general equilibrium
theory"); Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools:A Critique of the BehavioralFoundationsof Welfare
Economics, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977).
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cies among its numerous elements. What, then, is to be done?
II. A COMPLEX

SYSTEMS MODEL

To say that problems of this kind are computationally intractable
is not to say that they cannot be solved; indeed, any suggestion that
the Gardener's Dilemma is somehow insoluble has an odd ring to it,

for gardeners seem to "solve" this problem every day. Perhaps all
that we can say is that if they are solved-if there are efficient

algorithms that enable gardeners (and others) to find progressively
better configurations of these systems and perhaps even the "best"

configuration, without taking an infinite amount of time to do so-we
do not quite understand how that is done.38 This would seem to be a

matter of no small concern; if we do not understand how problems of
this kind are solved, how can we choose between alternative

solutions-between, say, the views of the judges of the Sixth Circuit
in the majority and those in the dissent, regarding the consequences
for artistic and scholarly production of re-configuring the rules of
copyright?
The burgeoning study of "complex adaptive systems" begins, in a
sense, with the observation that problems of this kind are routinely
"solved" all around us. The physical and biological worlds have

38. Professor Fuller had some interesting observations about the way that "polycentric
problems" of the kind we are discussing here could be solved. "So far as I can see," he wrote,
"there are only two suitable methods: managerial direction and contract (or reciprocity)."
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, supra note 30, at 398. The latter relies on
"reciprocal adjustment of each center of interest with those with which it interacts," as in, for
example, "an economic market [that] can solve the extremely complex problems of allocating
resources, 'costing' production, and pricing goods." Id. at 399. As to the former, Fuller
illustrated the manner in which managerial direction solves polycentric problems
by the baseball manager who assigns his players to their positions, decides when to
take a pitcher out, when and whom to pinch-hit, when and how far to shift the infield
and outfield for a particular batter, etc. The relationshipspotentially affected by these
decisions are in formal mathematical terms of great complexity-and in practical
solution of them a good deal of "intuition"is indispensable.
Id. at 398 (emphasis added). The role of human "intuition" in solving problems of this kind
should certainly not be ignored; much recent work has suggested that the "parallel processing"
capabilities of the human brain allow it to solve complex problems in ways that cannot be easily
mimicked by ordinary computational algorithms. See, e.g., MARVIN MINSKY, THE SOCIETY OF
MIND (1986); Rust, supra note 32 (manuscript at 32) (summarizing theories of cognition
developed by neuroscientists and computer scientists that hypothesize that the brain's parallel
processing capabilities allow it to "operate[] as a sort of 'society' or competitive economy").
But we understand little about how that intuition might operate and, regardless of the source
(or even the existence) of some built-in capability to solve complex problems of this kind,
intuitive solutions have the disadvantage that it is difficult, if not impossible, to choose among
alternative solutions; whose intuition does one trust regarding the copyright problem discussed
earlier in the text, that of the majority of judges in the Sixth Circuit or the dissenters?
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innumerable examples of richly interconnected systems that,
somehow, appear to reach (or more accurately, approach) optimal
configurations; long-term evolutionary forces seem to have "enabled
nature to 'discover' powerful hardware and software that is capable of
solving extremely difficult large-scale computational problems that
we are presently unable to solve [and that] [w]e are only just
beginning to appreciate and understand."3 9 We believe that the study
of these naturally-occurring problem-solving algorithms can shed a
great deal of light on problems like the Gardener's Dilemma and by
extension, those problems in law and social policy that it closely
40
resembles in its essential features.
Stuart Kauffman and his colleagues have developed a family of
complex system models-known as "NK models"-for studying
various problem-solving
algorithms defined over complex
4
1
interconnected systems. The model first specifies N (the number of
system elements) and a "state space," i.e., the number of different

states (S)that each element can be in.42 Interconnections between
39. Rust, supra note 32 (manuscript at 3). The literature on complexity theory is vast. The
best of the many readable introductions to the theory remains KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE
UNIVERSE, supra note 15. Other excellent introductions to the theory include PER BAK, How
NATURE WORKS (1996); COMPLEXITY: METAPHORS, MODELS, AND REALITY (George A.
Cowan et al. eds., 1994); PETER COVENEY & ROGER HIGHFIELD, FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXITY:
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER IN A CHAOTIC WORLD (1995); JOSHUA M. EPSTEIN & ROBERT
AXTELL, GROWING ARTIFICIAL SOCIETIES: SOCIAL SCIENCE FROM THE BOTrOM UP (1996);
JOHN H. HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER: How ADAPTATION BUILDS COMPLEXITY (1995).

A

more technical, but readable, general treatment can be found in KAUFFMAN, ORIGINS OF
ORDER, supra note 15.
40. We are not the first to suggest that the law is itself a "complex adaptive system"
amenable to study through the lens of this developing body of theory. See, e.g., Thomas Earl
Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence:Chaos, Brain Science, Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 TENN. L.
REV. 933 (1994); Andrew W. Hayes, An Introduction to Chaos and Law, 60 UMKC L. REV. 751
(1992); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Is Democracy Like Sex?, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1635 (1995); Mark
J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996); J.B. Ruhl
& Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administrative States: Using Complexity
Theory to Reveal the Diminishing Returns and Increasing Risks the Burgeoning of Law Poses to
Society, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 405 (1997); J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigmfor the
Dynamical Law-and-Society System: A Wake- Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern
Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity
Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its PracticalMeaning for Democracy,
49 VAND. L. REV. 1407 (1996) [hereinafter Ruhl, Fitness of Law]; J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of
Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System: How to Clean up the Environment by
Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933 (1997).
41. See KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 15, at 149-89; KAUFFMAN,
ORIGINS OF ORDER, supra note 15, at 40-69; Edward D. Weinberger, Local Properties of
Kauffman's N-k Model: A Tunably Rugged Energy Landscape, 44 PHYSICAL REV. A 6399
(1991); Edward D. Weinberger & Peter F. Stadler, Why Some Fitness Landscapes Are Fractal,
163 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 255 (1993).
42. In what follows we will refer only to models with the simplest state space possible, i.e.,
two possible states for each element.
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elements are modeled by assigning each element to a "spillover set,"
consisting of K elements.43 A "fitness function" must be specified,
representing each element's contribution to a system-wide variable
that is to be maximized (or minimized) -aggregate "fitness" of the
system as a whole -as a function of the state of the K elements in its
spillover set; that is, the fitness function for each element specifies a
fitness contribution for that element, given each of the SK different
configurations of the K elements in that element's spillover set.One well-known algorithm for finding the fitness maximum in
systems of this kind is a simple trial-and-error procedure known as
the "adaptive walk. ' 45 An adaptive walk in a complex system
proceeds as follows: Aggregate system fitness is calculated for the
initial configuration in which the system begins, after which one
randomly-selected element is "flipped" from state 0 to 1 (or vice
versa). Aggregate system fitness is recalculated for this changed
configuration, taking into account that the "flip" will affect the fitness
contribution of all elements on whom the flipped element "spills
over," i.e., all elements whose spillover sets include the flipped
element. If system fitness post-"flip" is higher than pre-"flip"-i.e., if
the new configuration has moved the system up the fitness
landscape-we change the system configuration to the new
configuration with the "flip" in place, and we repeat the process with
this new configuration as the initial configuration. If, however, the
change causes a decrease in system fitness-if the new configuration
has moved the system down the fitness landscape-the change is
rolled back, returning the flipped element to its starting
configuration, and the process is repeated from the original
configuration.
How well does this procedure identify configurations of higher
fitness? The adaptive walk is quite efficient at finding the highest
point on the fitness landscape in systems that have no interconnections

or spillovers between elements (i.e., in systems with K=1, where an
element's fitness contribution is a function only of its own state).46 On
43. These K elements can be chosen at random, from among all other system elements, or
in some other fashion (e.g., as those elements that are "nearby" when the elements are arrayed
in a two-dimensional matrix as in Figure 1).
44. See KAUFFMAN, ORIGINS OF ORDER, supra note 15, at 40-69.
45. See KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 15, at 166-80; KAUFFMAN,
ORIGINS OF ORDER, supra note 15, at 39-40; John H. Gillespie, Molecular Evolution over the
Mutational Landscape, 38 EVOLUTION 1116 (1984).
46. See KAUFFMAN, ORIGINS OF ORDER, supra note 15, at 40-46.
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average, it will take no more than N/2 "flips"-N/2 steps of the
adaptive walk-to find the optimal configuration of simple systems
with K=1; the efficiency of the algorithm, in other words, scales
47
linearly with the size of the system.
In systems with substantial spillover effects, however, the
algorithm performs progressively less and less well. On these more
rugged fitness landscapes,4 the adaptive walk is increasingly likely to
become trapped on local fitness peaks-places on the fitness
49
landscape from which there are no steps leading upwards at all.
Adaptive walks on rugged landscapes, therefore, tend to end after a
small number of steps when such a local peak is encountered and the
walk can proceed no further.50 That is, the more complex the system,
the more completely interconnected the individual elements, the
more likely it is that the adaptive walk will encounter a stable (though
suboptimal) equilibrium from which no upward moves can be made,
and the less likely it is that the adaptive walk will reach the global
maximum, the "best" configuration for the system as a whole.
Kauffman and his colleagues have uncovered a variant of the
adaptive walk-what Kauffman calls "patching" -that appears to
represent an improvement over the adaptive walk algorithm in these
more complex systems.5 1
The patching algorithm operates by
assigning each element in an NK system to a single group of elements,
or "patch."52 See Figure 2. The adaptive walk begins, as before, by
"flipping" the state of a randomly selected element. The algorithm
47. See id. at 46.
48. See id. at 47.
49. At the limit, i.e., in systems with maximally rugged fitness landscapes caused by random
spillovers from all elements to all other elements, the number of such local optima increases
exponentially with N. See id. ("these extremely rugged landscapes are so rife with local optima
that trapping on such optima is essential [sic] inevitable"); see also Stuart Kauffman & Simon
Levin, Towards a General Theory of Adaptive Walks on Rugged Landscapes, 128 J.
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 11 (1987) (describing relationship between inter-element spillover,
landscape "ruggedness," and the effectiveness of adaptive walk algorithms).
50. On randomly constructed systems with spillovers among all elements, Kauffman has
shown that adaptive walks terminate, on average, after the ln(N)th step. See KAUFFMAN,
ORIGINS OF ORDER, supra note 15, at 48-49. Thus, in such a system consisting of 100 elements,
although the state space is enormously large (consisting of 2'0 configurations), average walk
length is only approximately ln(100)=4.61 steps long. See id. In addition, the relative "height"
of these local peaks gets lower and lower, on average, as the interconnections among elements
increase and cause fitness landscapes to become more rugged, a phenomenon Kauffman labels
the "complexity catastrophe." See id. at 52-54; KAUFFMAN, AT HOME INTHE UNIVERSE, supra
note 15, at 194-95.
51. See KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 15, at 252-67; see also Ruhl,
Fitness of Law, supra note 40, at 1469-72 (describing Kauffman's patching algorithm and
speculating on its implications for the study of legal systems).
52. See Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 40, at 1469-72.
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then calculates the effect of this flip on the aggregate fitness of the
members of the patch of which the flipped element is a member, rather
than, as before, determining whether the new system configuration
increases fitness for the system as a whole.53 If patch fitness post-"flip"
is higher than pre-"flip," we change the system configuration to the
new configuration with the "flip" in place (regardless of whether the
"flip" causes the fitness of the system as a whole to increase or
decrease) before continuing the adaptive walk; if patch fitness post"flip" is lower than before, the change is rolled back (again,
regardless of the effect of the change on fitness of the system as a
whole), returning the flipped element to its starting configuration,
54
before moving on.
FIGURE

2

The system depicted in Figure 1, divided ("geographically") into four patches of 25
elements each.

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

Patch 1
@ 0
0
0 0 0 0
0 0 00 0
@0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 00
0 0 0 o
Patch 3

Patch 2
0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 00
0
0 0 0 00
0 0 0 00
00
00 0
00 0
00
0 00
0 0
0 0 0 0 0
Patch 4

What the patching algorithm does, in other words, is to evaluate
any change of state solely in terms of the effects of the change on the
fitness contribution of members of an element's patch. Patching is
the equivalent of the following decision rule: Individual elements will
be permitted to move from one state to another if, but only if, the
effect of the move on the aggregate fitness of the members of its patch
is a positive one. If members of the element's spillover set are not
53. See id.
54. See id.

CHICA GO-KENT LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 73:1055

also members of the element's patch, the move from one state to
another may affect the fitness of many individuals outside of its patch.
Those effects, however, will be entirely ignored when deciding
whether or not the move is to be permitted; that will be evaluated
solely on the basis of the within-patch effects of the change.5 5 The
patching algorithm seeks local, within-patch improvements in fitness
rather than global improvements; instead of adopting state changes
that impact positively on the system as a whole, it adopts state
changes that impact positively on some subset of the system, some
decision-making entity that can accept or reject the proposed move
depending solely on the effects of that move on the entity's aggregate
fitness.
Each patch is allowed to maximize its own fitness,
independent of any effects on the fitness of non-members or on the
56
aggregate fitness of the system as a whole.
Kauffman has shown that this patching algorithm can, in certain
circumstances, dramatically increase the efficiency of the search for
high aggregate system fitness; an adaptive walk over a patched system
finds, in a given number of steps, higher points on the fitness
landscape for the system as a whole than the same walk over the same
system without patching. 7 At least in certain circumstances, allowing
sub-system decision-making units to accept or reject state changes of
its members can be an effective means for moving the entire system
across the fitness landscape to find peaks of high global fitness.
Letting each of these subsets seek its own optimum can be an efficient
way to find the optimum for the system as a whole.
The result is a fairly remarkable one:
It is by no means obvious that the [highest aggregate fitness] of the
[system] will be achieved if [it] is broken into quilt patches, each of
55. See id.
56. Understanding the distinction between "patches" and "spillovers" is essential for
understanding the patching algorithm. Patches and spillovers each represent connections
between elements, though they function in very different ways. An element's "spillover set"
consists of those elements whose fitness contribution is a function of that element's state;
anthropomorphizing a bit, the members of my spillover set are those individuals whose "fitness
contributions" change as a result of my action. An element's "patch," on the other hand,
consists of those elements whose fitness contributions must increase if the element is to be
permitted to take any particular action, the elements that have some voice in determining
whether or not other patch members are allowed to change their state. An individual's
"spillover set" and "patch" may consist of the same elements, the two sets may have some
partial overlap, or the two sets may be entirely disjoint; as we discuss below, a measure of how
disjoint the two sets are-what we call "congruence" -turns out to be an important determinant
of the efficiency of this algorithm for finding high points on the fitness landscape. See infra pp.
1081-84.
57. See KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 15, at 256-64.
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which tries to [maximize its own fitness] regardless of the effects on
surrounding patches. Yet this is true. It can be a very good idea, if
a problem is complex and full of conflicting constraints,to break it
into patches, and let each patch
try to optimize, such that all patches
58
coevolve with one another.
Patching is effective, it appears, because it reduces the tendency
of the adaptive walk to become trapped on suboptimal local fitness
peaks. As noted above, the simple adaptive walk often becomes
trapped on such local peaks, unable to dislodge itself (which requires
moving down the landscape) in order to reach higher points beyond.
Patching ameliorates this problem by allowing such downward moves;
the patching algorithm allows the system to adopt configurations that
yield lower aggregate fitness (provided that the change increases local
patch fitness), which serves to dislodge the system from otherwise
stable but suboptimal fitness peaks. By moving to points lower on the
fitness landscape, it can reach other, higher configurations that it
would otherwise be unable to reach under the simple adaptive walk.
It is, in other words, precisely the systemically destabilizing effects of
the patching procedure that makes it effective.
Kauffman's description of patching as quite possibly a
"fundamental mechanism underlying adaptive evolution in
ecosystems, economic systems, and cultural systems"5 9 is an apt one
and generates a number of important questions about the way that
complex problems can be solved in a wide range of systems. For
example, what are the characteristics of systems in which patching is
or is not effective? What makes for a "well-designed" patch for
problem-solving purposes? If patching works by destabilizing the
search for optimal configurations of complex systems, dislodging the
search from suboptimal local fitness peaks, can this effect be too
destabilizing, preventing steady hill climbing over the fitness
landscape? Are there general rules pursuant to which patches can be
formed that render them more or less effective for the task of solving
58. Id. at 262 (emphasis added); see also id. at 264 ("[Hlard problems with many linked
variables and loads of conflicting constraints can be well solved by breaking the entire problem
into nonoverlapping domains."). Professor Ruhl describes the patching algorithm as follows:
[T]ake a hard, conflict-laden task in which many parts interact, and divide it into a
quilt of nonoverlapping patches. Try to optimize within each patch. As this occurs,
the couplings between parts in two patches across patch boundaries will mean that
finding a "good" solution in one patch will change the problem to be solved by the
parts in adjacent patches. [C]hanges in each patch will alter the problems confronted
by neighboring patches, and the adaptive moves by those patches in turn will alter the
problem faced by yet other patches ....
Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 40, at 1469.
59. KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE, supra note 15, at 264.
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for fitness maxima?
We have begun building NK systems to explore these questions,

with particular attention to the way that the construction of patch
boundaries affects the effectiveness of the patching algorithm.
Consider again a patched NK system such as the one displayed in
Figure 2. Each element in such a system can be said to be a member

of two different groups: a "spillover group" (consisting of those
elements whose contribution to aggregate fitness is affected by the

state of the element in question) and a "patch" (consisting of those
elements whose aggregate fitness is measured to evaluate whether the
element's change of state is to be allowed). These two sets may be

entirely disjoint or completely overlapping (or something in between
these two extremes); that is, the relationship between patch
membership and spillover in any system may be such that the effects

of an element's change of state are felt only by members of other
patches, by a mixture of elements some of whom are and some of
whom are not members of its patch, or entirely by members of its own
patch.
We can thus define, for any NK system, a variable -what we call
"congruence" -to measure the overlap between patches and spillover
sets. Congruence is defined as the proportion of elements in an
individual's spillover set that are also members of that individual's
patch, averaged over all elements in the system.6 Congruence can
60. For example, imagine a system of 10 elements (N=10), with four elements in each
element's spillover set (K=4), divided into two patches of 5 elements each. Patch 1 contains
elements 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, Patch 2 the other elements (6-10). Spillovers are distributed as follows
(an X in the row i column j in the following table indicates that element i's spillover set includes
element j):

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

.-------- Patch
1
2
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

1 elements ---------3
4
5
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

-----6

X
X
X
X

7

X
X
X
X

Patch 2 elements -------8
9
10

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

I
Congruence
1.00
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25
1.00
1.00
0.75
0.50
0.25

Element 3's spillover set thus consists of elements 3, 4, 5, and 6, and its congruence is thus
0.75 (because 3 of the 4 members of its spillover set are also members of Patch 1). The average
congruence for this system is 0.70. Notice that, in this example, the fitness contribution of
element 6 will be affected by a change in element 3's state, but that effect will play no role in the
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vary from zero (representing a system in which patch and spillover
sets are entirely disjoint for all elements and, thus, a system in which
any element's change of state affects only the fitness contribution of
members of other patches) to one (representing a system in which
patch and spillover sets overlap completely and, thus, a system in
which all spillover effects are "internalized" within patches where the
change of any element's state affects only members of its own patch).
What happens to the effectiveness of the patching algorithm as
this measure of within-patch spillover internalization moves from
zero to one? We have constructed several thousand NK systems,
systematically varying the congruence of each to observe the effect of
those variations on the ability of the patching algorithm to find points
of high aggregate system fitness. Details of our modeling procedures
are set forth in the Appendix; our results are summarized in the
graphs displayed in Figure 3.61

decision whether to keep or to "roll back" a change in element 3's state inasmuch as element 6
is not a member of element 3's patch (Patch 1).
61. The complete data set is available from the authors.
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Figure 3
A view of representative results of our adaptive walk simulations. Each point on the
graphs represents the result of a single 10,000 step adaptive walk over a 1000-element
system. Values of percentage change in aggregate system fitness are plotted on the
Y-axis; system congruence is plotted on the X-axis. Results are displayed for systems
defined with patches of 33, 40, 45, 50, and 66 members, and with three different
values for K (the extent of inter-element spillover) (K=8, K=12, and K=24).

IK=12

K=8

Patch
Size

K=24

i.

0

M

a,¢

M6

0

1

1,

0

M

M0 M

M1

12

66

0

C2 04

06

08

1

12

M_____

C2-

03
az
0

II

c.

Ct120
F
0

al

0

;Qa
l

C0

O03

1

12

0U2U4Q6

Q81 12

0

.1o,I

.
(
02040M0001 12

19981

"CHAOS PREVAILING ON EVERY CONTINENT"

Each point in the graphs in Figure 3 represents the results of a
single adaptive walk of 10,000 steps over a 1000-element system; the
graphs show the percentage increase in aggregate system fitness at the
conclusion of the adaptive walk on the Y-axis and system congruence
on the X-axis. Figure 3 displays results for systems constructed with

relatively high inter-element spillover (K=24), intermediate spillover
(K=12), and low spillover (K=8) at each of five different patch sizes
(33, 40, 45, 50, and 66).
As the graphs strikingly demonstrate, the effectiveness of
patching as a search algorithm-the ability of the adaptive walk to

uncover higher points on the system's fitness landscape-is a positive
function of system congruence; generally speaking, it is apparent that
more congruent systems are able to uncover higher points on the
fitness landscape than less congruent systems. At all values of K and
at all patch sizes, the curves appear to have roughly similar shapes,

showing increasing search efficiency with increasing degrees of
congruence, although in all cases, interestingly, search efficiency
appears to level off or drop at the highest levels of system
congruence.

62

III. IMPLICATIONS: PATCHING, CONGRUENCE, AND THE THEORY
OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM

To summarize, we have suggested in the foregoing that (a) the
problem of finding "better" configurations of complex interconnected
systems is both a highly general one and one that is in many
circumstances analytically intractable, (b) allowing sub-groups
("patches") to seek their own optimal local configurations can
improve the efficiency of searching for global optima, and (c) the
effectiveness of patching as a means of solving these complex
62. These qualitative results are confirmed by a more systematic quantitative analysis. We
analyzed our entire data set, comprising 11,686 separate adaptive walks, by means of multiple
linear regression, using percentage system fitness change (our proxy for search efficiency) as the
dependent variable, and K, patch size, and congruence as the independent variables. The
results indicate that almost 90% of the variation in search efficiency can be explained by
variation in these three independent variables (R 2=0.877); the best-fit least-squares equation for
these data is
Y (% change in fitness) = 0.07 - 0.002 (K) + 0.00004 (Patch size) + 0.27 (Congruence)
Only the relationship with congruence and K are statistically significant; that is, holding K and
patch size constant, variations in congruence explain a highly statistically significant amount of
the variation in search efficiency (t=265.73, P<<0.001), as do variations in K (holding patch size
and congruence constant) (t=-34.79, P<<0.001). Patch size, however, is more weakly (though
still statistically significantly) related to variations in search efficiency (t=2.19, P=0.025).
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problems is dependent upon the relationship between patch
boundaries and spillover effects between individual elements-i.e.,
patching appears to work best in systems with the "right" balance
between those inter-element effects that are internalized within
patches and those that are not.
Reflecting the focus of this symposium, we believe that our
analysis has important implications for questions of Internet
governance and legal theory. Legal institutions are (or should be)
designed to solve problems defined over complex systems-problems
like the simple "coursepack" problem discussed above. If we are to
have effective problem solving in this complex policy space, a central
goal for the design of legal institutions is the formation of congruent,
independently optimizing decision-making sub-groups.
This is not a new idea. Processes whereby "complex systems"
are divided into "patches," with each "patch" allowed to permit or
prohibit "changes of state" of "patch members" on the basis of the
aggregate "within-patch" effects of that change on all patch members,
are familiar enough in political and legal realms. We know them as
decentralized, federalist rule-making systems, systems in which
individuals are members of non-overlapping groups, each of which
decides whether or not to permit or prohibit particular conduct based
upon the effects of that conduct on the perceived welfare of the
individuals within the sub-group, and they are, of course, ubiquitous.
They also tend to define their "patch boundaries"
geographically. At the global level, for instance, the boundaries
around legally-recognized decision-making patches-sovereign states
in the international system-have, at least since the Treaty of
Westphalia in 1648, been defined in geographical terms; the power
and the right to enact and enforce law are lodged with sovereigns
whose domains of authority are circumscribed largely in territorial
terms, applicable within a particular geographic area to persons (real
63
or fictional), events, and conduct located there.
This is, of course, no accident. Both the ability to ascertain the
will of a proximate people and the ability to control the actions of
63. See references cited in Post, The "Unsettled Paradox", supra note 1; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 201 (1987) ("Under international law,
a state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of
its own government, and that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with
other such entities."). This pattern, of course, is repeated at lower levels of the governance
hierarchy, e.g., among states or provinces within national federal systems, municipalities or
counties within states, etc.
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those people by means of enforceable rules stem from traditional
reliance on communications technologies that operate best at close
range and on enforcement by means of physical forces that work best
over shorter distances. And the foregoing discussion suggests other
ways in which this "makes sense." Defining boundaries of decisionmaking patches in geographic terms is likely to be an effective
mechanism to find the highest "fitness peak" for any system where
spillovers are themselves distributed geographically. That is, given a
system in which spillover effects are physically clustered and
attenuate with increasing distance from the locus of the participating
individuals, a system in which "neighbors" (in the geographicalsense)
are more likely to affect the welfare of each other than they are to
affect the welfare of those less physically proximate, dividing such a
system into geographically-defined patches will produce largely
congruent decision-making units, allowing more effective searching
for the system-wide optima.
We think it reasonable to suggest that inter-individual spillover
effects in human societies have, for the bulk of human history, been
distributed largely in this manner, that the effects of individual
conduct on the welfare of others have been determined to a
significant extent by the geographical proximity between them, and
that the impact of individual actions has been felt (as a general
matter) most intensely by those closest, physically, to the actor and/or
to the transaction.
Defining patch boundaries-the boundaries
between sovereign states and the units within those states-in
geographical terms makes for effective searching in policy space in
such a world.
But the assumption of geographically-clustered spillovers no
longer holds nearly as powerfully as it once did; indeed, the course of
human history can be described in terms of a slow, but now rapidlyaccelerating increase in the magnitude of "between-patch
spillovers" - an increase in the likelihood that the effects of conduct
(state changes) in one geographically-defined jurisdiction (patch) will
have substantial effects on large numbers of individuals from other
patches. Systems like these, in which an orderly relationship between
patch membership and spillovers has been perturbed in a substantial
way, must find ways to "re-couple" these two parameters-to reestablish the congruence of decision-making groups-if they are to
continue to function as efficient problem-solving mechanisms. As the
Internet helps to complete the transition from largely geographical to
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largely a-geographical spillover effects-as spillover effects between
individuals become distributed more-or-less at random with respect
to the geographical location of those individuals-continuing to define
patch membership in geographical terms produces decision-making
groups of low congruence, and the independent decisions of such
patches will be increasingly unlikely to find high peaks on the global
welfare landscape.61
This is the central problem of Internet governance: how to
constitute the decision-making units that can, through the "pull and
tug" of contending rule-sets, continue to find configurations of rulesets that move the global interconnected system "upwards" in
welfare-space. How should the boundaries of these units be set?
This would be a difficult enough task even were this perturbation the
result of a single systemic "shock" that had somehow altered the
pattern of spillover effects; but the Internet poses an even more
difficult problem, for the spillover patterns are themselves shifting
and doing so in "Internet time" as a consequence of the rapid
technologies
communications
of the underlying
evolution
themselves. 65 What process or processes are capable of adjusting
64. Readers should note that we are not suggesting that cyberspace is somehow a "selfenclosed regime" where communications have no consequences for individuals or entities not
participating in those communications. See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1215-16 (1998) (suggesting that "regulation skeptics" like us somehow fail to
recognize that "[a] communication in cyberspace often has consequences for persons outside the
computer network in which the communication took place" and that "communications via
cyberspace produce harmful, real-world effects on those who have not consented to the private
ordering of the cyberspace community"). Our argument, rather, is that the Internet and other
related communications technologies cause those spillover effects from cyberspace to real space
to be distributed more or less at random with respect to physical geography.
65. See Bernard J. Hibbitts, Yesterday Once More: Skeptics, Scribes and the Demise of Law
Reviews, 30 AKRON L. REV. 267, 314 n.182 (1996) ("The shift from institutions to individuals as
the primary locus of publishing activity may only be facilitated by the speed at which Internet
publishing technology evolves. Already journalists are talking about 'Internet time'. [sic] the
accelerated rate at which new Web browsers and other applications are developed and enter the
marketplace. Change is occurring so fast that it is almost impossible for actual or would-be
publishing organizations to keep up: by the time they collectively decide to take one step, the
technology has advanced by another. In this situation, autonomous individuals may be the only
agents able to make consistent use of the latest publishing innovations."); Moisrs Naim, Editor's
Note, 107 FOREIGN POL'Y 5, 5 (1997) (pace of change "overwhelms the capacities of most
individuals and institutions to grasp all of its implications or realize all of its interconnections");
Bert Ely, FinancialServices Modernization, REGULATION, Spring 1997, at 18, 19, available online (last visited Nov. 19, 1998) <http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg20n2-per.html>
(arguing that modernization efforts in banking regulation "are proceeding against the backdrop
of technological changes that make the current regulatory regime unworkable. Technology is
making it increasingly difficult to neatly compartmentalize banking, insurance, and securities
products."); Michele Matassa Flores, Free Range Celebrates Elder Status on the Web, SEATTLE
TIMES, Apr. 18, 1996, at El ("Everything about the Internet is changing so fast, there should be
a way to interpret Internet 'time' in the same way we translate a mutt's age into dog years.");
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patch boundaries to "track" these rapidly changing spillover patterns?
At the very least, would-be regulators of cyberspace need to pay

close additional attention to the ways that these two parameters can
be re-coupled. We have suggested elsewhere that the Internet calls

for a higher degree of deference to rulemaking within a-geographical,
decentralized, voluntary associations, 66 and we believe that the

foregoing provides normative underpinnings for this view. Allowing
individuals to define the boundaries of their own, a-geographical
patches by voluntary movement into and out of decision-making
bodies that have little or even no ties to a particular physical
location 67-what

we might call "self governance"-may allow both

more rapid and more "congruent" responses to shifts in spillover
patterns.

Individuals are more likely to be in possession of the

relevant information regarding the effect of spillover on their own
welfare and can act more quickly on that information than can agents
at a higher level of the organizational hierarchy (i.e., their elected

representatives) to whom that information must be re-directed and
John Markoff, A Quicker Pace Means No Peace in the Valley, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1996, at D1
(quoting Andrew Grove, chief executive of the Intel Corporation, "we are now living on
Internet time" as "traditional product cycles give way to an endless stream of upgrades"); Kathy
Rebello, Inside Microsoft, Bus. WK., July 15, 1996, at 56 ("Microsoft, already the ultimate
hardcore company, is entering a new dimension. It's called Internet time: a pace so frenetic it's
like living dog years-each jammed with the events of seven normal ones."); see also Bensusan
Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1997) (analogizing application of established law to
the "fast-developing world of the [I]nternet" to "trying to board a moving bus").
66. See Johnson & Post, Law and Borders, supra note 1, at 1387-1402 (arguing that
responsible a-geographical self-governance institutions can emerge on the Internet); Johnson &
Post, The New "Civic Virtue", supra note 1, at 25-26 ("The best available solution to conflicts in
individual goals and values regarding online conduct may be found by allowing individuals to
join distinct, boundaried communities on the Internet, each with its own divergent set of rules,
and by allowing those communities to deal with external pressures by devising their own
mechanisms for filtering out unwelcome messages and with internal conflict by easing (or
requiring) exit. Democratic debate and traditional legislative action may not, after all, be the
best way to make the best public policy for the Internet. If we can preserve individual liberty to
make educated and empowering choices among alternative online rule sets, our most thoughtful
and high-minded collective-action option may be to abandon the process of elections and
deliberations regarding some single best law to be imposed impartially on all from the top down.
We may instead find a new form of civic virtue by allowing the governance of online actions to
emerge 'from the bottom up' as a result of the pull and tug between local online 'jurisdictions'
that do not attempt to act in a dispassionate or disinterested or 'public-spirited' manner.").
67. The notion of a-geographical rule-making entities is itself not a novel one; we are all
embedded in a web of decision-making bodies-fictional legal persons (e.g., partnerships or
corporations), voluntary associations of all kinds (e.g., the Catholic Church, the shareholders of
General Motors, or the members of Usenet discussion groups)-that exist on a plane separate
from, and often entirely independent of, geographical sovereigns. All may have their own
decision-making processes for determining whether particular conduct on the part of its
members is, or is not, permitted. The boundaries around these groups can be geographically
fluid, determined by the interaction between each association's "membership" rules and the
individuals' decisions to move into or out of the group.
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re-processed before "official" boundary realignment can occur.
Individuals on whom spillover is most directly concentrated can, using
their ability to "enter" and "exit" such venues, have the most impact
on the rules applicable to the spaces from which the spillover
emanates, which may allow both more rapid and more "congruent"

responses to shifts in spillover patterns.

In other words, putting

boundary-definition in the hands of individuals directly affected by
the rules made within those boundaries may allow a faster and more
flexible response to rapidly changing spillover patterns. 68
68. We do not mean to suggest that this exhausts the possible universe of "recoupling"
devices; indeed, we would hope that the analysis presented here would stimulate work on
constructing a typology of such devices. As an example of the kinds of devices we have in mind,
consider suggestions that have been advanced for solving spillover/patch "uncoupling" in the
context of metropolitan area governance. As in cyberspace, a central problem for metropolitan
area governance in the world of atoms is precisely the increasing degree to which spillover
effects and the boundaries between municipalities have become uncoupled, see, e.g., Richard
Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV.
1115, 1133 (1996) (observing that local boundaries "probably always generated some spillovers,
but in the past, when local governments were set farther apart by unincorporated land, and
people focused more of their activities within the territorial limits of their particular locality, the
The spillover problem is more acute today
spillovers may have been relatively slight ....
because local borders frequently abut one another, and people range widely in their daily
In contemporary metropolitan areas, local
activities across multiple local boundaries.
governments are sure to generate externalities and area residents are sure to be excluded from
participating in the decisions of many localities that have direct implications for their lives."),
and Professors Ford and Frug have proposed a novel recoupling mechanism in this context.
Given existing patterns of extensive cross-border spillover, they argue, the boundaries of local
patches (municipalities) must shift to take those spillovers into account; we have to "replace our
current legal conception of localities with one that embraces the ageographical city" by
"treat[ing] people not as located solely in one jurisdiction but as 'switching center[s] for all the
networks of influence' within the region[s] that affect their lives." Jerry Frug, Decentering
Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 253, 323 (1993) (second alteration in original) (footnote
omitted). This can be accomplished, they suggest, by means of changes in local voting rules to
allow nonresidents to vote in local elections. Local elections would be
"open to all members of a metropolitan region or even to all citizens of a state." All
local elections in the region would be held on the same day; voters would receive a
number of votes equal to the number of local offices to be filled and could cast them
wherever they chose. Under such a system of regionwide cumulative voting for local
office, "voters would effectively draw their own jurisdictionalboundaries,decide which
local governments were most important to them, and allocate their votes
With political rights decoupled from residency, the need to deny
accordingly." ...
localities the power to engage in locally self-interested or exclusionary regulation
disappears.
Briffault, supra, at 1156-57 (summarizing Ford and Frug proposals) (second emphasis added)
(quoting Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1843, 1909-10 (1994) [hereinafter Ford, The Boundaries of Race]);
see also Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A PartialResponse to Richard Briffault, 48
STAN. L. REv. 1173 (1996) [hereinafter Ford, Beyond Borders]; Ford, The Boundaries of Race,
supra, at 1857-59 (proposing regionwide cumulative voting); Frug, supra, at 329-30 (same).
The premises underlying this solution to the boundary problem are, we believe, largely
correct: that individuals may be in the best position to process and act upon information about
the way that actions taken within particular decision-making venues affect their own personal
utility and that they can be relied upon to act accordingly, i.e., to join (and thereby influence the
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As for the implications of this work for legal theory more

generally, it might come as little surprise to those familiar with
theories of "competitive federalism" that dividing up a complex
system into independent self-optimizing decision-making patches can
increase the efficiency of the search for optimal system-wide
configurations. 69 Those theories reflect a broad consensus regarding
two underlying benefits of decentralized decision-making procedures
of this kind. 70 First, decentralized decision-making can function as an

efficient sorting mechanism; mobile individuals can, via migration
into (and exit out of) different decision-making units, efficiently
71
match their preferences for different menus of local public goods.
Second, dividing a decision-making polity into smaller, local decisionmaking sub-units may, because information about local conditions
and local preferences is imperfectly distributed and tends to be

concentrated locally, be subject to fewer inefficiencies of information
transfer; therefore, local governments and consumers will be more
likely to make better (welfare-maximizing) decisions. 72 There is an
equally broad consensus on the "cost" side of the decentralization
rules within) the relevant decision-making patch. See Ford, Beyond Borders, supra, at 1189
n.45; Frug, supra, at 329-30.
69. Good introductions to the vast literature on competitive federalism include Vicki Been,
"Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions
Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (1991); Dan L. Burk, The Market for Digital Piracy, in
BORDERS IN CYBERSPACE, supra note 4, at 205; John D. Donahue, Tiebout or Not Tiebout?
The Market Metaphor and America's Devolution Debate, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1997, at 73, 7382; Frank H. Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON. 23
(1983); Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism,55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147
(1992); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Rethinking Federalism, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 43
(1997); Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, Economic Competition Among Jurisdictions:
Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?, 35 J. PUB. ECON. 333 (1988); Susan RoseAckerman, Does Federalism Matter? Political Choice in a FederalRepublic, 89 J. POL. ECON.
152 (1981); Barry Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving
Federalism and Economic Development, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995).
70. See generally Yingi Qian & Barry R. Weingast, Federalism as a Commitment to
Preserving Market Incentives, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 83 (1997) (describing these "two wellknown sources of benefits from decentralization").
71. This derives from the well-known Tiebout model. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure
Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). Tiebout demonstrated that an
idealized system comprising (a) a "perfectly elastic" supply of jurisdictions, (b) perfectly mobile
inhabitants, (c) perfect information about the characteristics of each jurisdiction, and (d) no
inter-jurisdictional externalities can produce the optimal level of public goods within the system
as a whole. See Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 943 (1998) and references cited therein.
72. This theme derives from the work of Friedrich Hayek. See HAYEK, supra note 36, at
66-81 (suggesting that a "polycentric order" without a "directing center" can be superior to a
"hierarchic order" by dispensing with necessity of communicating all the information on which
its several elements act to a common center); F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35
AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
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equation as well: decentralized decision-making is disfavored where
jurisdictions are not "congruent," i.e., where there are significant
73
intercommunity interdependencies or spillovers.

A greater understanding of the patching algorithm described
here -greater understanding, we cheerfully admit, than the authors of
this paper now have-may shed some light on these mechanisms.

Patching may be more than merely a metaphor for decentralized
political decision-making structures (though it is that and no less
interesting because of it); those structures may, in a sense, be
instantiations of the patching algorithm in the political realm.
Federalism may "work," in other words, because it is a "patching
algorithm," a means for solving public policy problems defined over a
most

complex

"social

welfare

landscape.

74

As

such,

an

understanding of the factors that determine the effectiveness of the
algorithm cannot help but have an impact on our understanding of
these political decision-making institutions.
73. It is virtually axiomatic, in the law and economics literature, that intercommunity
spillovers distort the otherwise efficient outcomes reached by decentralized decision-making
institutions. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 5
(1993) (noting that while the "benefits from federalism are axiomatic in American politics, it is
also well recognized that a federal system can.. . diminish individual welfare... if the costs and
benefits of a specific public policy do not fall within the boundaries of one jurisdiction"); Frank
H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosureand the Protection of Investors, 70
VA. L. REv. 669, 697 (1984) (observing general rule, in connection with interstate competition
for corporate charters, that inter-jurisdictional competition is most effective "when the
consequences of a decision will be experienced in one jurisdiction"); Epstein, supra note 69, at
149 (noting that the inter-jurisdictional spillover problem is not addressed by a federalist system
relying on exit rights to maintain efficient allocations of public goods); Clayton P. Gillette, In
PartialPraise of Dillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?,
67 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 959, 971 (1991) (discussing general notion that "[o]utside the Tiebout
world of no externalities ... some constraints on local power are necessary to prevent strategic
local behavior"); Inman & Rubinfeld, supra note 69, at 46-47 (observing that "when there are
significant intercommunity interdependencies (like pure public goods or spillovers)," dispersed
decision-making by decentralized sub-units "may result in economically inefficient public
policies," and noting that "[flor most economists," dispersed decision-making with "a strong
central government to provide pure public goods and control intercommunity externalities,
essentially defines what federalism is about"); Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The
Political Economy of Federalism, Center for the Study of Law and Society, University of
California Berkeley School of Law (Working Paper No. 94-15, 1994) (discussing the assumption
of the absence of inter-jurisdictional externalities in the Tiebout model and the central
importance of understanding the extent of spillover effects in determining the appropriate
decision-making units); cf Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition: Rethinking
the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1210, 1250-52 (1992) (observing that "race-to-the-bottom" arguments in regard to interjurisdictional competition are distinct from arguments that interstate externalities may justify
federal intervention).
74. See Ruhl, Fitness of Law, supra note 40, at 1469-73 (interpreting the common law and
the federalist division of decision-making authority in the U.S. Constitution as patching
devices).
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Our analysis, for example, may help illuminate the role of interjurisdictional spillover in patched systems. There is a suggestion in
our data that the efficiency of dispersed decision-making processes is
not a simple inverse function of the magnitude of inter-jurisdictional
spillovers, i.e., that configuring the boundaries between jurisdictions
in such a way that all inter-jurisdictional externalities are
"internalized" is not a necessary condition for the effective
functioning of the patching algorithm. While it is true that systems
with high congruence appear to be more efficient at finding systemwide fitness peaks than those with more inter-patch spillover, there
appears to be somewhat more to the story. In the systems we have
thus far examined, perfectly congruent systems with no inter-group
externalities are often less effective at finding system-wide optima
than systems with a somewhat lower degree of congruence. See
Figure 3. In other words, our results suggest-tentatively, to be sure,
but provocatively -that search efficiency may decline if congruence is
too low or too high and that there may be an intermediate
congruence "sweet spot" causing systems with an intermediate level
of congruence to be better at finding higher points on the fitness
landscape than both those in which spillovers are only weakly
internalized within patches (low congruence) and those in which
spillovers were perfectly internalized within patches (high
congruence).
This interpretation is consistent with our understanding of the
underlying mechanics of the patching algorithm. As noted above,
patching appears to be effective precisely because it is destabilizing.
It allows local configurations to change in ways that may be suboptimal in the short term from the standpoint of the system as a
whole, driving the system down from suboptimal foothills in fitness
space; but these moves alter the environment of other local units,
generating reactions and adjustments by these adversely affected
"neighbors" and creating a pull and tug among conflicting rule sets
that ultimately allows the overall matrix to achieve a better solution
over the course of a large number of moves. To anthropomorphize,
at the group level, patching facilitates a kind of conversation among
conflicting patches, a dialogue that may improve the search for better
configurations overall.
Justice Brandeis memorably praised
federalism as a means to allow "a single courageous state [to] serve as
a laboratory ... without risk to the rest of the country";75 it may well
75. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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be, however, that it is of some systemic value that some "local
experiments" do pose risks to other jurisdictions, causing those
jurisdictions to confront (and to solve) new problems that permit new
frontiers of the fitness landscape to be explored.
CONCLUSIONS

[Like many other precious human goals, the rule of law may best
be achieved by not aiming at it directly. What is perhaps most
needed is not an immediate expansion of international law, but an
expansion of international community, multiplying and
strengthening the bonds of reciprocity among nations. When this
has occurred-or rather as this occurs- ... the law can act as a
gardener who prunes an imperfectly growing tree in order to help
the tree realize its own capacity for perfection. This can occur only
when all concerned genuinely want the tree to grow and to grow
properly. Our task is to make them want this.76
We are confident that the study of behavior in the world of bits
will, perhaps paradoxically, illuminate the role that physical and
geographical constraints play in the world of atoms because only by
eliminating geography can we truly understand the role that
geography plays in human affairs.7 7 We have admittedly traveled
somewhat far afield for the underpinnings of the preceding
discussion, but we believe that Fuller was (on this and many other
questions) largely correct-the law's role is to "prune[] an imperfectly
growing tree in order to help the tree realize its own capacity for
perfection. 7 T8 We need to take the Gardener's Dilemma and the
limitations of our ability to comprehend the movement of complex
systems across rugged landscapes more seriously.
We should,
perhaps, concentrate less on trying to specify optimal configurations
of legal systems and more on the design of processes through which
more, rather than less, favorable configurations may emerge, less on
the question "what is the best rule to govern a particular
transaction?" and more on the question "what is the best algorithm
for finding more acceptable rule configurations?" At the very least,
an understanding of generally applicable principles that describe the
behavior of interdependent systems of all kinds should inform our
76. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, supra note 30, at 8.
77. This is, perhaps, not paradoxical at all. As the legal anthropologist Leopold Pospisal
was fond of pointing out, if we lived in a world that was entirely of one colar-red, say-we
would not only be unable to truly understand 'green' or 'blue,' we would be unable to
understand 'red' itself.
78. Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, supra note 30, at 8.
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policy debate in cyberspace and elsewhere.
The proof, of course, is in the pudding; the value of this (or any
other) conceptual model lies in its ability (or lack thereof) to provide
us with insight into the behavior of actual systems and to generate
interesting second- and third-order hypotheses about observed
phenomena. We fully recognize that our work has only scratched a
very (dare we say it?) complex surface and that further investigation
is needed if the full implications of this approach to social systems are
to be uncovered. We hope that our efforts stimulate others to help us
in the search for a more thorough and refined understanding of the
behavior of these systems.
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APPENDIX:
SIMULATING ADAPTIVE WALKS IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS

The computer-based NK systems that we studied were built
using a program written by Jeff Williams in Java (the source code for
which is available from the authors). The program has an outer
"shell," through which the user can set up five parameters defining
the NK system, and an inner "engine" that generates the system and
runs the adaptive walk algorithm. The five parameters are:
*
The number of elements (N);
*
The number of elements in each element's spillover set (K);
*
The number of equal-sized patches into which elements will
be placed (P);
*
The number of "steps" of the adaptive walk (i.e., the
number of "flips" of randomly chosen elements before the
search terminates); and
*
The desired value for system congruence (C, 0 < C < 1).
Once the user chooses values for each of these parameters, 79 the
program generates an NK system by first constructing a "pool" of N
elements and assigning each of the N elements to one of the P patches
by subdividing the N-element pool into groups of the appropriate
size, depending upon the chosen values for N and P; that is, to
generate P equally-sized patches in an N-element system, each patch
must contain N/P members, and the program therefore assigns the
first N/P elements to Patch 1, the next N/P elements to Patch 2, and so
on for all P patches.
The program chooses the K elements in each element's spillover
set at random from among the other elements of the system, subject
to two important constraints. First, each element is assumed to be a
member of its own spillover set; that is, we have embodied the
plausible (but not logically necessary) assumption that the state of
every element always affects its own fitness. Inasmuch as we were
primarily interested in studying the way that congruence influenced
the effectiveness of patching and the adaptive walk, we designed the
program to choose the remaining K-1 elements so as to achieve the
pre-set level of congruence (C) for each element (and, therefore, for
the system as a whole). In order to achieve a congruence of C, an
79. The program allows the user to specify a range for each of these parameters, allowing
the program shell to select random values from the ranges for each run.
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element's spillover set must contain (C*K) of its patch members.
Because each element is, by definition, a member of its own patch,
and because each element has already been placed into its own
spillover set, an additional (C*K)-I within-patch elements must be
included in that element's spillover set. Each patch contains N/P
elements and, therefore, there are (N/P)-1 other elements (besides
the individual element whose spillover set is being constructed) in the
patch; the program chooses (C*K)-1 of these patch members at
random and places them into the spillover set. Having thus chosen
(C*K) members of the spillover set, the program chooses the
remaining elements (K-(C*K)) at random from among the other nonpatch elements.
By way of illustration, consider a system with the following
parameters:
N= 1000
*
K=8
*
SP
=20
0.75
SC=
Constructing the spillover set for any element-element number
51, say-proceeds as follows. The system is first divided into 20
patches (of 50 elements each); elements 51-100 are placed into patch
2. To achieve a congruence of 0.75, 6 of the 8 elements of element
51's spillover set must be members of patch 2. Element 51 is placed
into its own spillover set first; 5 other elements are chosen randomly
from patch 2 and added to element 51's spillover set. The remaining
two members of element 51's spillover set are chosen at random from
all system elements other than those in patch 2.
Completing this process for each of the N elements produces an
NxN spillover table showing the elements in each element's spillover
set; the spillover table for our hypothetical system might look as
follows, with an "X" in row i column j indicating that element j has
been placed into element i's spillover set:

"CHAOS PREVAILING ON EVERY CONTINENT"

1998]

1
1

2

3

X

3

X

51

...

998

999

1000

X
X

X

4

X

51

X

X

998

1000

...

X

2

999

4

X

X

X

X

X
X

X

This table shows, for example, that elements 51 and 999 are in
element 51's spillover set. The full 1000xl000 spillover table would
show K "Xs" in each row, representing the K elements in each
element's spillover set.
From this spillover table the program constructs the converse
"spill-in" table for each element. That is, just as row 51 shows all
elements on whom element 51 spills over, column 51 shows all
elements that "spill in" to element 51, all elements whose state helps
determine the fitness contribution for element 51. (In the above
example, we see that elements 2, 51, and 1000 spill over onto element
51 and are therefore members of element 51's "spill-in" set.)
Element 51's fitness contribution in any system configuration is
computed as follows. The fitness contribution of element 51 is, by
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definition, a function of the states of the K elements in its spill-in set. 80
There are 2 K possible configurations for element 51's spill-in set (since
each element in the spill-in set can be in one of two possible states).
In the absence of any other information regarding the nature of the
interconnections between the elements, the fitness contribution for
81
element 51 given any particular configuration is assigned at random;
that is, the fitness table for element number 51 is constructed by
assigning a randomly chosen fitness value to each possible state
2
configuration of the elements in the spill-in set.
The adaptive walk begins in a randomly chosen system
configuration. The program first computes the fitness contribution of
each individual element. This requires (a) examining the state (1/0)
of each of the members of that element's spill-in set and (b)
consulting the fitness table to determine the element's fitness
contribution. The program stores both the aggregate fitness for each
patch (the sum of the fitness contributions of each patch element) and
for the system as a whole.
A randomly chosen element is then "flipped" from its current
state to the opposite state (i.e., from 0 to 1 or vice versa). The
program re-computes the fitness contribution of all elements whose
contribution may be affected by the flip, i.e., all elements in the
spillover set of the flipped element. The program then re-computes
patch fitness for the flipped element's patch (i.e., the sum of the
fitness contributions of all elements belonging to that patch). If that
sum is greater than (or equal to) the fitness of that patch prior to the
flip, the adaptive walk continues from the changed configuration; if
80. On average, given that we have assigned elements to spillover sets at random, each
element's spill-in set will similarly contain K elements.
81. Kauffman describes the rationale for random assignment as follows:
Several factors suggest that we might fruitfully model complex [inter-element]
interactions by assigning the effects at random in some way. First, we may as well
admit our ignorance in the biological cases at the present moment. Second, we are
trying to build rather general models.., to begin to understand what such landscapes
look like and what organismal features bear on landscape ruggedness. If we model the
fitness effects of [inter-element] coupling "at random," we will obtain the kind of
general models of landscapes we seek. Third, if we are lucky, we will find that real
landscapes in some cases look very much like our model landscapes.... In short, we
can seek general laws in biology concerning the structure and even the evolution of
fitness landscapes by building models.
KAUFFMAN, AT HOME INTHE UNIVERSE, supra note 15, at 171.
82. In the illustration above, given 8 elements in element 51's spill-in set, the fitness table
for element 51 will contain 256 (2) entries, one for each of the 256 combinations of these 8
elements. To avoid unnecessary storage, in actual design this table starts empty and is
constructed as needed. If a requested entry does not exist, a new random value is created and
stored in the table.
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that sum is less than patch fitness prior to the flip, the flip is "rolled
back" (i.e., the flipped element is returned to the state it was in prior
to the flip), and the walk continues.
The process terminates when the program has completed the
specified number of steps. The program's output consists of the
difference between the aggregate system fitness at the conclusion of
the adaptive walk and aggregate system fitness in the initial
configuration.
All NK systems analyzed in this paper contained 1000 elements
(N=1000) and the adaptive walks were allowed to proceed for 10,000
steps (S=10,000). The program's outer shell varied the other
parameters as follows:
* K (size of spillover set) was randomly chosen from the set
{4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 241.
* P (number of patches) was randomly chosen from the set
112, 13,...,33}.
" C (the desired value for system congruence) was randomly
chosen from the set {1/K, 2/K,..., K/K}.

